- Path:
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Corrigendum to: Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries
Files
External resources
Periodical
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
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2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
-
2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
Article
- Title:
- Corrigendum to: Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: Using an appropriate game-theoretic approach, this article develops a non-cooperative two-stage game in a Cournot duopolistic network industry in which firms strategically choose whether to produce compatible goods in the first decision-making stage. Quality differentiation affects the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE): (i) the network effect acts differently between low- and high-quality firms, depending on their compatibility choice; (ii) if the network externality is positive (resp. negative), to produce compatible (resp. incompatible) goods is the unique SPNE; however, this equilibrium configuration leads the high-quality firm to be worse off; (iii) there is room for a side payment from the high- to the low-quality firm to deviate toward incompatibility (resp. compatibility) under positive (resp. negative) network externality. This payment represents a Pareto improvement on the firm side but not from a societal perspective, as consumers would be worse off. The article also pinpoints the social welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- network externality ; product compatibility ; Cournot duopoly ; quality differential ; L1 ; L2 ; D4
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- DDC Group:
- 330 Wirtschaft
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Free Access
- Title:
- Corrigendum to: Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: Using an appropriate game-theoretic approach, this article develops a non-cooperative two-stage game in a Cournot duopolistic network industry in which firms strategically choose whether to produce compatible goods in the first decision-making stage. Quality differentiation affects the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE): (i) the network effect acts differently between low- and high-quality firms, depending on their compatibility choice; (ii) if the network externality is positive (resp. negative), to produce compatible (resp. incompatible) goods is the unique SPNE; however, this equilibrium configuration leads the high-quality firm to be worse off; (iii) there is room for a side payment from the high- to the low-quality firm to deviate toward incompatibility (resp. compatibility) under positive (resp. negative) network externality. This payment represents a Pareto improvement on the firm side but not from a societal perspective, as consumers would be worse off. The article also pinpoints the social welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- network externality ; product compatibility ; Cournot duopoly ; quality differential ; L1 ; L2 ; D4
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- DDC Group:
- 330 Wirtschaft
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Free Access
