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When to Mix It Up? Sorting, Inequality, and Re-distributive Taxation
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Periodical
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
-
2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
-
2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
Article
- Title:
- When to Mix It Up? Sorting, Inequality, and Re-distributive Taxation
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2026
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: This paper examines optimal taxation in a labour market with assortative matching and two-sided heterogeneity. Positive assortative matching, where high-type workers pair with similar types, enhances production efficiency but increases income inequality. Using a matching model with transferable utility, we analyse optimal redistributive tax schedules under various market equilibria. Our findings show that supermodularity in production does not guarantee positive matching as optimal, and increasing mixed-skill matching reduces inequality. In mixed matching equilibria, the optimal tax is regressive at higher incomes but progressive at lower incomes. Tax progressivity decreases with higher productivity of mixed-matching pairs and a greater proportion of skilled workers. Government policy aims to reduce inequality through direct transfers and influencing worker sorting, with significant implications for tax policy design amidst technological changes and evolving skill distributions.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Open Access unbekannt
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- optimal taxation ; assortative matching ; inequality ; efficiency ; H21 ; J31 ; J64
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- DDC Group:
- 330 Wirtschaft
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- When to Mix It Up? Sorting, Inequality, and Re-distributive Taxation
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2026
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: This paper examines optimal taxation in a labour market with assortative matching and two-sided heterogeneity. Positive assortative matching, where high-type workers pair with similar types, enhances production efficiency but increases income inequality. Using a matching model with transferable utility, we analyse optimal redistributive tax schedules under various market equilibria. Our findings show that supermodularity in production does not guarantee positive matching as optimal, and increasing mixed-skill matching reduces inequality. In mixed matching equilibria, the optimal tax is regressive at higher incomes but progressive at lower incomes. Tax progressivity decreases with higher productivity of mixed-matching pairs and a greater proportion of skilled workers. Government policy aims to reduce inequality through direct transfers and influencing worker sorting, with significant implications for tax policy design amidst technological changes and evolving skill distributions.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Open Access unbekannt
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- optimal taxation ; assortative matching ; inequality ; efficiency ; H21 ; J31 ; J64
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- DDC Group:
- 330 Wirtschaft
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Technik
- Wirtschaft
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
