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The Role of Technology in an Endogenous Timing Game with Corporate Social Responsibility
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Periodical
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
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2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
-
2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
Article
- Title:
- The Role of Technology in an Endogenous Timing Game with Corporate Social Responsibility
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: This research studies the endogenous choice of simultaneous (Cournot) or sequential (Stackelberg) moves in a quantity-setting duopoly in which firms have social concerns and convex technologies. A parsimonious non-cooperative endogenous timing game (ETG) is developed to determine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). The article shows that the market structure strictly depends on the (endogenous) adoption of the available technology. In detail, when costs are convex, the sequential move equilibrium can emerge as the SPNE of the ETG. Results contrast the SPNE emerging in a duopoly – with or without CSR – in which firms produce with constant returns to scale technologies (linear costs), where only simultaneous competition occurs. The article also discusses the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE. The main findings also offer empirical and policy implications. The paper finally considers a mixed duopoly and shows that the results of Amir and De Feo (2014. “Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly.” International Journal of Game Theory 43: 629–58) – sequential move equilibrium – are confirmed. Still, it pinpoints new results about the private firm’s degree of social concern in determining the market leadership when goods are strategic substitutes.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Kein Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- endogenous timing ; quantity competition ; corporate social responsibility ; L1 ; D4
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- The Role of Technology in an Endogenous Timing Game with Corporate Social Responsibility
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: This research studies the endogenous choice of simultaneous (Cournot) or sequential (Stackelberg) moves in a quantity-setting duopoly in which firms have social concerns and convex technologies. A parsimonious non-cooperative endogenous timing game (ETG) is developed to determine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). The article shows that the market structure strictly depends on the (endogenous) adoption of the available technology. In detail, when costs are convex, the sequential move equilibrium can emerge as the SPNE of the ETG. Results contrast the SPNE emerging in a duopoly – with or without CSR – in which firms produce with constant returns to scale technologies (linear costs), where only simultaneous competition occurs. The article also discusses the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE. The main findings also offer empirical and policy implications. The paper finally considers a mixed duopoly and shows that the results of Amir and De Feo (2014. “Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly.” International Journal of Game Theory 43: 629–58) – sequential move equilibrium – are confirmed. Still, it pinpoints new results about the private firm’s degree of social concern in determining the market leadership when goods are strategic substitutes.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Kein Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- endogenous timing ; quantity competition ; corporate social responsibility ; L1 ; D4
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
