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Memoryless-Strategy Equilibria of a N -Player War of Attrition Game with Complete Information
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Periodical
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
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2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- The B.E. journal of theoretical economics
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter
- Note:
- Gesehen am 04.12.20
- C!URL-Ä(06-02-12);C:auf der Degruyter-Seite werden bei den früheren Jg. (1.2001ff) die Artikel der darin aufgegangenen Zeitschriften aufgeführt, daher wurde der ev obiger Veröffentlichung nicht auf 1.2001 zurückdatiert;355!URL-Ä(04-12-20)
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- ISSN:
- 1935-1704
- ZDB-ID:
-
2268339-2
- VÖBB-Katalog:
- 35340968
- Keywords:
- Zeitschrift
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
Article
- Title:
- Memoryless-Strategy Equilibria of a N -Player War of Attrition Game with Complete Information
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: Consider a war of attrition game in continuous time with complete information, in which N ≥ 2 players compete for N − K prizes. I focus on the equilibria in which the strategies follow exponential distributions, which are memoryless. When K = 1, such an equilibrium can be explicitly characterized. The equilibrium certainly exists if N = 2. If N ≥ 3, it exists as long as the weakest player is not too weak compared to the average. If it exists, the equilibrium is unique under some conditions. When K ≥ 2, the game typically has nondegenerate equilibria in which K − 1 relatively weak players concede at the beginning. The model can be extended to the case in which the players have loser-dependent valuations. The model helps to solve a generalized exit game in a “nature oligopoly” and an all-pay auction with ascending bids.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Kein Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- all-pay auction ; complete information ; loser-dependent valuation ; N -player ; war of attrition ; D74 ; H41 ; L13
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
- Title:
- Memoryless-Strategy Equilibria of a N -Player War of Attrition Game with Complete Information
- Publication:
-
Berlin Boston, Mass.: De Gruyter, 2025
- Language:
- English
- Information:
- Abstract: Consider a war of attrition game in continuous time with complete information, in which N ≥ 2 players compete for N − K prizes. I focus on the equilibria in which the strategies follow exponential distributions, which are memoryless. When K = 1, such an equilibrium can be explicitly characterized. The equilibrium certainly exists if N = 2. If N ≥ 3, it exists as long as the weakest player is not too weak compared to the average. If it exists, the equilibrium is unique under some conditions. When K ≥ 2, the game typically has nondegenerate equilibria in which K − 1 relatively weak players concede at the beginning. The model can be extended to the case in which the players have loser-dependent valuations. The model helps to solve a generalized exit game in a “nature oligopoly” and an all-pay auction with ascending bids.
- Scope:
- Online-Ressource
- Note:
- Kein Open Access
- Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet
- Keywords:
- all-pay auction ; complete information ; loser-dependent valuation ; N -player ; war of attrition ; D74 ; H41 ; L13
- Classification:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Collection:
- Sozialwissenschaften
- Wirtschaft
- Technik
- Sonstiges
- Copyright:
- Rights reserved
- Accessibility:
- Eingeschränkter Zugang mit Nutzungsbeschränkungen
